skill-comply
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes arbitrary shell commands defined in the
setup_commandsfield of generated scenarios withinscripts/runner.py. These commands are produced by an LLM inscripts/scenario_generator.pybased on the content of the skill file being analyzed. A malicious skill file could manipulate the LLM into generating harmful commands (e.g., system deletion, unauthorized file access, or data exfiltration) which are then executed on the host system viasubprocess.run.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is a significant indirect prompt injection surface inscripts/scenario_generator.pyandscripts/spec_generator.py. The content of the skill or rule file under analysis is directly interpolated into prompts for the LLM. Ingestion Point:args.skill.read_text()inscripts/run.pypassed to generators. Boundary Markers: Content is wrapped in simple---delimiters in the prompt templates. Capability Inventory: The agent can execute shell commands through therunner.pyscript. Sanitization: There is no validation or filtering of the LLM-generated commands before execution beyond splitting arguments withshlex.split.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scriptscripts/runner.pyand other generator scripts invoke theclaudeCLI usingsubprocess.runwith dynamically generated prompts. While the tool use is restricted to a specific set of tools via--allowedTools, the overall behavior is governed by prompts derived from unverified external content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata