social-intel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface identified through the ingestion of external web content. \n
- Ingestion points: Search result snippets retrieved from Exa and Tavily as defined in manifest.json. \n
- Boundary markers: Absent; instructions do not explicitly mandate the use of XML delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for external snippets. \n
- Capability inventory: Limited to network API calls via vendor-provided CLI tools; no arbitrary local code execution or file system access. \n
- Sanitization: No specific filtering or escaping of retrieved search text is described in the workflow. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation utilizes the 'selat' and 'selat-pay' CLI utilities for installation, validation, and execution. These are standard vendor resources for the SELAT-AI platform. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Network operations target api.exa.ai and x402.tavily.com. These are legitimate search service endpoints required for the skill's stated purpose of gathering intelligence and providing corroborated briefs.
Audit Metadata