atlassian-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides instructions for setting up MCP servers using standard package managers. It references the official
@anthropic/mcp-atlassianpackage and community alternatives likemcp-atlassian(available via PyPI) andatlassian-mcp(available via NPM). These instructions are necessary for the skill's primary purpose of server integration and target well-known registries. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements workflows that ingest data from external sources, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via tool calls like
jira_get_issue,jira_search,confluence_get_page, andconfluence_searchinreferences/common-workflows.md. - Boundary markers: The provided code templates do not explicitly show the use of delimiters or 'ignore instructions' warnings when processing retrieved text.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses write-capable tools including
jira_update_issue,jira_add_comment,confluence_create_page, andconfluence_update_pageacross the workflow examples inreferences/common-workflows.md. - Sanitization: While an
escapeHtmlutility is provided, it is used for documentation generation; however, the skill's constraints explicitly mandate sanitizing user-provided query strings. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: While the skill discusses the use of API tokens and OAuth secrets, it follows security best practices by discouraging hardcoding. The
references/authentication-patterns.mdfile provides concrete implementation examples for fetching secrets from secure providers like AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, and HashiCorp Vault. It also includes configuration templates that use environment variables for sensitive values.
Audit Metadata