sre-engineer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python subprocess module to execute various system administrative tools across several files.
  • Evidence in SKILL.md: Use of subprocess.run to execute kubectl rollout restart for pod management.
  • Evidence in references/automation-toil.md: Use of subprocess.run for system inspection (df) and file cleanup (find).
  • Evidence in references/incident-chaos.md: Execution of kubectl delete and tc (traffic control) to simulate system failures.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a runbook automation framework that executes commands provided as strings through a shell environment.
  • Evidence in references/automation-toil.md: The AutomatedRunbook class uses subprocess.run(step.command, shell=True), which allows for the execution of arbitrary shell strings.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requires and performs actions that involve high-level system permissions.
  • Evidence in references/automation-toil.md: Includes commands to restart system services via systemctl restart and delete system logs.
  • Evidence in references/incident-chaos.md: Includes commands to modify network configurations via iptables and tc, which typically require root or administrative access.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its ingestion of external operational data combined with high-privilege capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze architecture diagrams, incident logs, and toil reports as defined in the Core Workflow of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities, including executing shell commands, managing Kubernetes resources, and modifying system/network configurations.
  • Sanitization: The AutomatedRunbook implementation does not demonstrate any sanitization or validation of the step.command string before it is executed via the shell.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 27, 2026, 11:50 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — sre-engineer