sre-engineer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Python
subprocessmodule to execute various system administrative tools across several files. - Evidence in
SKILL.md: Use ofsubprocess.runto executekubectl rollout restartfor pod management. - Evidence in
references/automation-toil.md: Use ofsubprocess.runfor system inspection (df) and file cleanup (find). - Evidence in
references/incident-chaos.md: Execution ofkubectl deleteandtc(traffic control) to simulate system failures. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a runbook automation framework that executes commands provided as strings through a shell environment.
- Evidence in
references/automation-toil.md: TheAutomatedRunbookclass usessubprocess.run(step.command, shell=True), which allows for the execution of arbitrary shell strings. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill requires and performs actions that involve high-level system permissions.
- Evidence in
references/automation-toil.md: Includes commands to restart system services viasystemctl restartand delete system logs. - Evidence in
references/incident-chaos.md: Includes commands to modify network configurations viaiptablesandtc, which typically require root or administrative access. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its ingestion of external operational data combined with high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze architecture diagrams, incident logs, and toil reports as defined in the
Core WorkflowofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities, including executing shell commands, managing Kubernetes resources, and modifying system/network configurations.
- Sanitization: The
AutomatedRunbookimplementation does not demonstrate any sanitization or validation of thestep.commandstring before it is executed via the shell.
Audit Metadata