semantius-modeler
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code execution by generating temporary TypeScript (.ts) scripts in a scratch directory (.tmp_deploy/) and executing them using the Bun runtime (bun run). These scripts are constructed using data extracted from user-supplied *-semantic-spec.md files. Although the skill employs JSON.stringify to mitigate shell injection, the pattern of generating and executing scripts based on external input represents a significant security surface.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the semantius CLI tool to perform catalog operations. It executes subcommands such as create_entity, update_entity, and postgrestRequest by spawning processes via Bun.spawn within its deployment and seeding logic. It also executes a consistency-check script from a sibling skill directory.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from semantic specification files and incorporates it into the logic for catalog deployment and sample data generation.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads and parses user-supplied *-semantic-spec.md files during Stage 1.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or boundary markers used to isolate user-provided text (such as entity descriptions) from the operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write to the local file system, execute shell commands, and interact with vendor-specific CLI tools.
- Sanitization: While the skill uses JSON serialization for transport to prevent shell-level command injection, it does not perform semantic sanitization to prevent embedded instructions in descriptions from influencing agent behavior.
Audit Metadata