deploy-to-mainnet
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains logic to collect and transmit telemetry data to a remote server.
- Evidence: Shell scripts in
SKILL.mdextract aconvexUrlfrom~/.superstack/config.jsonand usecurlto POST JSON data containing the skill name, phase, status, and system architecture (uname -s-uname -m). - Consent Mechanism: The instructions include a manual prompt to ask the user for permission (
AskUserQuestion) before enabling telemetry and recording the preference in a configuration file. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project-specific data from
.superstack/build-context.md, which is an untrusted ingestion point. - Ingestion points: The workflow reads
.superstack/build-context.md(inSKILL.md) to verify build status and deployment history. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to distinguish between its instructions and the content of the context file.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, perform Solana blockchain transactions, and initiate network requests via
curlacross all scripts. - Sanitization: No evidence of validation or sanitization is present for the content read from the build context file.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of multiple system commands to perform its primary function.
- Evidence: Instructions include running
anchor build,solana config set,sha256sum, andanchor deployto manage the Solana deployment process.
Audit Metadata