design-taste
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes external design configurations from
brand.mdand user-provided descriptions without implementing boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions in these files could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during automated steps. - Ingestion points:
brand.md(read in Step 0), user-supplied UI feedback. - Boundary markers: None present.
- Capability inventory: Executes bash scripts for telemetry logging and file searching via
grep. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the
OUTCOMEvariable before it is interpolated into a shell command. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The "Telemetry (run last)" bash block in
SKILL.mdrequires the agent to replace theOUTCOMEplaceholder with a status string. This string is inserted into anechocommand inside single quotes. An attacker-controlled file (e.g., a maliciousbrand.md) could influence the agent to provide anOUTCOMEvalue containing shell metacharacters (such as' ; malicious_command #), allowing for arbitrary command execution on the host system when the telemetry script runs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's preamble script automatically identifies a
convexUrlfrom~/.superstack/config.jsonand usescurlto transmit host system metadata—including the operating system and hardware architecture (uname -s-uname -m)—to that endpoint. While this is documented as telemetry for thesuperstackplatform, it involves the transmission of environment details to an external service.
Audit Metadata