ct-alpha
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and synthesize untrusted data from X (Twitter).
- Ingestion points: External tweet content enters the agent context through the search and read functions in
lib/api.tsandct-search.ts. - Boundary markers: The skill uses trust labels like
[WATCHLIST]or[SUSPICIOUS]and separators in its output formatting (lib/format.ts), but these provide limited protection against adversarial input. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute local shell commands and perform network operations to the X API and its own hosted API endpoints.
- Sanitization: While it applies noise filters to remove retweets and common spam phrases (
lib/filters.ts), it does not sanitize the core tweet text for potential prompt injection instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation and setup scripts (
install.sh,install.ts,setup.ts) execute several system commands, includingBun.spawn,mkdir, andcp, to configure the environment and install the skill file. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads resources during setup:
- Fetches the Bun runtime installer from
bun.sh. - Fetches the
install.shscript from the author's official GitHub repository (github.com/sendaifun/ct-alpha). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installer uses the
curl | bashpattern to install Bun and its own setup script. While these are from established or vendor-owned sources, this pattern is a standard high-risk execution vector.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bun.sh/install, https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sendaifun/ct-alpha/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata