textme
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill establishes a remote command bridge by installing a daemon that routes inbound iMessages to a Claude Code session, enabling the remote execution of code and filesystem operations from a mobile device.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches and installs software from a community GitHub repository (
njerschow/textme) and installs external dependencies vianpmto facilitate the bridge between external messages and the local system. - [PERSISTENCE]: Configures the remote access daemon to remain active across user sessions and system reboots using
pm2(pm2 startup,pm2 save) and macOSlaunchdservice files. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Includes instructions for registering the daemon as a system-level service via
pm2 startupand a custom installation script (./scripts/install-launchd.sh), which can grant the daemon persistent elevated status on the host. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface by ingesting untrusted data from an external messaging service and passing it to an AI agent with terminal access.
- Ingestion points: Inbound iMessages received via the Sendblue API (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The system relies exclusively on a phone-number whitelist for authorization to execute commands (SKILL.md).
- Capability inventory: Full filesystem access, directory navigation (
cd), and terminal command execution via Claude Code (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any input validation or sanitization for incoming message content before it is processed by the execution environment.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The daemon directly parses and runs administrative commands on the host machine, including directory changes (
cd), process termination (stop), and state resets.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata