headroom
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to access and evaluate sensitive authentication data within the user's home directory, specifically reading
~/.grok/auth.json(to check for OIDC tokens) and~/.grok/config.toml. Accessing credentials of external services constitutes a high-risk data exposure concern. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill identifies and provides instructions for modifying the user's PowerShell profile to add or remove custom functions (e.g.,
function grok). Modifying shell profiles is a standard persistence mechanism that can be abused to execute code in every new terminal session. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill recommends several command-line operations, including the execution of a local PowerShell script
.\TOOLS\Ensure-Headroom-Grok.ps1which is not included in the provided source files, making it an unverifiable local dependency. It also directs the agent to delete configuration files such as~/.grok/models_cache.jsonand perform environment modifications. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill is explicitly designed to process large, untrusted tool outputs such as logs, grep results, JSON dumps, and crash stacks.
- Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the ingested content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (via the
headroomCLI), modify environment variables, and perform file system deletions. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the external data before it is processed by the compression tools.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata