obsidian-bases
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a system that processes data from external notes and their properties, which serves as a vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from note frontmatter properties (e.g.,
status,author) and file metadata (e.g.,file.name,file.path,file.tags) as described in thefiltersandformulassections ofSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not instruct the agent to use specific delimiters or boundary markers when interpolating note data into formulas, nor does it provide warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The formula language supports logic (
if), string manipulation, and rendering through functions likehtml()andlink(). It also allows fetching file objects viafile(path). - Sanitization: While an
escapeHTML()function is included in thereferences/FUNCTIONS_REFERENCE.md, its use is not explicitly required or demonstrated for untrusted data in the main workflow. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents a domain-specific formula language that allows for the runtime evaluation of expressions and rendering of dynamic content.
- Evidence: The
formulassection in.basefiles, described inSKILL.md, executes expressions at runtime to compute values from note properties for display. - Evidence: The
html()function defined inreferences/FUNCTIONS_REFERENCE.mdallows for the direct rendering of string content as HTML within the Obsidian application view.
Audit Metadata