obsidian-bases

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a system that processes data from external notes and their properties, which serves as a vector for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is read from note frontmatter properties (e.g., status, author) and file metadata (e.g., file.name, file.path, file.tags) as described in the filters and formulas sections of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not instruct the agent to use specific delimiters or boundary markers when interpolating note data into formulas, nor does it provide warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The formula language supports logic (if), string manipulation, and rendering through functions like html() and link(). It also allows fetching file objects via file(path).
  • Sanitization: While an escapeHTML() function is included in the references/FUNCTIONS_REFERENCE.md, its use is not explicitly required or demonstrated for untrusted data in the main workflow.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents a domain-specific formula language that allows for the runtime evaluation of expressions and rendering of dynamic content.
  • Evidence: The formulas section in .base files, described in SKILL.md, executes expressions at runtime to compute values from note properties for display.
  • Evidence: The html() function defined in references/FUNCTIONS_REFERENCE.md allows for the direct rendering of string content as HTML within the Obsidian application view.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 15, 2026, 12:44 AM