gsd-progress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a
--forceflag for the--nextcommand, which is explicitly documented to "bypass safety gates." This provides a mechanism for the agent to override or ignore established safety constraints and validation steps during workflow execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
--doflag accepts freeform natural language intent strings via$ARGUMENTSand dispatches them to other workflows. This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in the input (e.g., if the input is sourced from an untrusted file or external tool) could influence the agent's subsequent actions. - Ingestion points: User-provided
$ARGUMENTSprocessed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the freeform input string.
- Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use powerful tools including
Bash,Read,Grep,Glob, andSlashCommand. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation before the intent is dispatched to the routing logic.
Audit Metadata