workspace-builder

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data from a ServiceNow instance while maintaining significant capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through tools like snow_query_table, snow_discover_all_workspaces, and snow_uib_discover which read from ServiceNow system and application tables.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to handle data retrieved from the ServiceNow instance as potentially untrusted.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute server-side scripts via snow_execute_script, perform table writes, and call internal ServiceNow APIs.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit mechanism described for sanitizing retrieved data before it is processed or used to generate subsequent commands.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes dynamic content as part of its core development workflow.
  • It provides ES5 JavaScript templates (e.g., GlideRecord operations) intended for runtime execution on the target ServiceNow instance via snow_execute_script.
  • It manages the creation of UI Builder macroponents by assembling and writing JSON strings to the composition field of the sys_ux_macroponent table.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 6, 2026, 07:16 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — workspace-builder