workspace-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external data from a ServiceNow instance while maintaining significant capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through tools like
snow_query_table,snow_discover_all_workspaces, andsnow_uib_discoverwhich read from ServiceNow system and application tables. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to handle data retrieved from the ServiceNow instance as potentially untrusted.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute server-side scripts via
snow_execute_script, perform table writes, and call internal ServiceNow APIs. - Sanitization: There is no explicit mechanism described for sanitizing retrieved data before it is processed or used to generate subsequent commands.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes dynamic content as part of its core development workflow.
- It provides ES5 JavaScript templates (e.g., GlideRecord operations) intended for runtime execution on the target ServiceNow instance via
snow_execute_script. - It manages the creation of UI Builder macroponents by assembling and writing JSON strings to the
compositionfield of thesys_ux_macroponenttable.
Audit Metadata