gitlab-cli-guide
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources including GitLab issue titles, merge request descriptions, and CI/CD job logs. Malicious actors could potentially embed instructions in these fields to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
glab issue view,glab ci trace, andglab mr viewacross multiple sub-skills. - Boundary markers: The skill explicitly implements
--- BEGIN/END EXTERNAL CONTENT ---delimiters in scripts likescripts/ci-debug.shandscripts/create-mr-from-issue.shto isolate untrusted content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including the ability to create/delete repositories, approve merge requests, and execute predefined test commands through
glabandgitCLI tools. - Sanitization: Scripts such as
scripts/create-mr-from-issue.shinclude logic to slugify and sanitize issue titles before using them in branch names. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/mr-review-workflow.shexecutes a test command provided as an argument. However, this is mitigated by a strict, hardcoded allowlist (ALLOWED_COMMANDS) that restricts execution to standard test runners likenpm test,pytest, andcargo test. Arbitrary command injection is prevented by validating the input against this fixed list.
Audit Metadata