r2-upload
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary tool
r2_uploadallows the agent to read arbitrary local files and upload them to a remote storage endpoint. This functionality represents a high-risk exfiltration vector if an attacker manages to influence the agent's choice of file path. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to the lack of validation on the
file_pathandkeyarguments insrc/index.ts. - Ingestion points: The
file_pathargument is taken directly from the agent's context and used to read local files. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mddo not include delimiters or warnings for the agent to verify the sensitivity of the files it is asked to upload. - Capability inventory: The skill combines local file reading (
readFileinsrc/index.ts) with network transmission to remote S3 endpoints (PutObjectCommand). - Sanitization: There is no sanitization or block-listing for sensitive file paths (e.g.,
~/.ssh/,.env,/etc/shadow) or file types. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages highly sensitive S3/R2 credentials. Although the
onboard.tsscript correctly sets file permissions to0600for the configuration file, the interactive setup process involves entering plaintext credentials into a terminal, which could be captured by local logging or history.
Audit Metadata