instagram-marketing

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill bundle contains a significant surface for processing untrusted external content.
  • Ingestion points: The ig-hook-extractor and ig-repurposer skills take user-supplied captions and source text, while ig-audience-insights fetches data from Apify actors (hashtag and profile scrapers).
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions rely on Natural Language boundaries but lack explicit programmatic delimiters or "ignore instructions" system warnings when processing this untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations (requests), local file reading (for media uploads), and command execution (via the DIY poster mode).
  • Sanitization: While the ig-humanizer component cleans text for stylistic "AI tells," it does not perform security-centric sanitization to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the ingested marketing data.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The lib/backend_selector.py component supports an advanced "DIY" publishing mode.
  • It utilizes subprocess.run to execute a shell command defined in the INSTAGRAM_SKILLS_CUSTOM_POSTER environment variable.
  • Although it uses shlex.split for argument parsing and list-based execution (mitigating basic shell injection), it allows the agent to trigger arbitrary user-configured local binaries on approval.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs legitimate network operations to well-known service providers to support its core functions.
  • It fetches niche performance data from the Apify API (api.apify.com).
  • It uploads media and schedules content through the Publora API (api.publora.com).
  • It generates on-brand illustrations using the Pixfaro API (api.pixfaro.com).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 06:16 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — instagram-marketing