linkedin-hook-extractor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch and process content from external LinkedIn posts and comments. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if a post contains instructions designed to manipulate the agent.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mddefines steps to "Fetch post body" usinglib.ApifyClient.fetch_post(url)and process "untrusted content" from posts, comments, and engager profiles. - Boundary markers: The skill includes a dedicated "Untrusted content" section with explicit instructions for the agent to treat fetched text as data only and never as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
ApifyClientfor network fetches and processes text for classification. - Sanitization: Prompt-level instructions are present to prevent the agent from executing commands found within fetched data.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The classification logic described in
references/classification-rules.mdsuggests the use of a rule-matching engine to score formulas. - Evidence: The
score_formulafunction inreferences/classification-rules.mdutilizes aneval_featurefunction to process rules such asanaphora_count >= 3. While these rules are defined within the skill's static configuration files, the pattern involves runtime evaluation of logic strings.
Audit Metadata