linkedin-humanizer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted text provided by the user (LinkedIn drafts) to perform humanization and auditing passes. It possesses capabilities to write to the local filesystem (updating
references/voice-profile.md) and make network calls to external APIs. This configuration presents a surface for indirect prompt injection, although the specific regex-based scrubbing logic and lack of complex tool chaining mitigate the risk of arbitrary instruction execution. - Ingestion points: User-provided text in
SKILL.md(input text for humanization). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not define specific delimiters to wrap untrusted input when processing it.
- Capability inventory: File system write access for voice profile persistence (
sub-skills/voice-profile.md); network operations to AI detection APIs (scripts/test_detectors.py). - Sanitization: Not explicitly implemented in the prompt instructions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a utility script
scripts/test_detectors.pywhich is designed to be executed by the agent to interface with third-party AI detection APIs. The script processes user input as data for HTTP requests, avoiding unsafe shell execution or interpolation of the untrusted text. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation and scripts reference external AI detection services (including GPTZero, Originality.ai, ZeroGPT, Sapling, and Copyleaks) and image generation tools (Pixfaro). These are categorized as well-known technology services integrated for specific functional purposes and are documented neutrally.
Audit Metadata