linkedin-marketing

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill bundle features five components (Comment Drafter, Reply Handler, Hook Extractor, Thread Monitor, and Engager Analytics) that ingest untrusted content from LinkedIn, such as post bodies and comment threads.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters through lib/apify_client.py using actors to fetch remote content from public LinkedIn posts.
  • Boundary markers: The skill incorporates a robust security policy in references/untrusted-content.md. It explicitly instructs the agent to treat fetched data as non-authoritative and ignore instructions found within it, effectively delimiting data from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can publish content via API or local command execution after user approval.
  • Sanitization: Content is filtered for identifiers and URNs using regex in lib/url_parser.py rather than being passed raw to sensitive operations.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill bundle includes an advanced 'DIY' backend that executes shell commands defined in a local environment variable.
  • Evidence: In lib/backend_selector.py, the skill uses subprocess.run to invoke a command string retrieved from the LINKEDIN_SKILLS_CUSTOM_POSTER environment variable.
  • Context: This is a documented extensibility feature designed for advanced users to integrate custom posting tools. It uses shlex.split for safe argument parsing and executes without a shell to minimize injection risks. It is only triggered after explicit user approval of a draft.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 6, 2026, 08:35 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — linkedin-marketing