linkedin-marketing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill bundle features five components (Comment Drafter, Reply Handler, Hook Extractor, Thread Monitor, and Engager Analytics) that ingest untrusted content from LinkedIn, such as post bodies and comment threads.
- Ingestion points: Data enters through
lib/apify_client.pyusing actors to fetch remote content from public LinkedIn posts. - Boundary markers: The skill incorporates a robust security policy in
references/untrusted-content.md. It explicitly instructs the agent to treat fetched data as non-authoritative and ignore instructions found within it, effectively delimiting data from instructions. - Capability inventory: The agent can publish content via API or local command execution after user approval.
- Sanitization: Content is filtered for identifiers and URNs using regex in
lib/url_parser.pyrather than being passed raw to sensitive operations. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill bundle includes an advanced 'DIY' backend that executes shell commands defined in a local environment variable.
- Evidence: In
lib/backend_selector.py, the skill usessubprocess.runto invoke a command string retrieved from theLINKEDIN_SKILLS_CUSTOM_POSTERenvironment variable. - Context: This is a documented extensibility feature designed for advanced users to integrate custom posting tools. It uses
shlex.splitfor safe argument parsing and executes without a shell to minimize injection risks. It is only triggered after explicit user approval of a draft.
Audit Metadata