x-marketing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
lib/backend_selector.py, the skill can execute a user-defined shell command provided via theX_SKILLS_CUSTOM_POSTERenvironment variable. While this is an intended feature for custom posting backends and usesshlex.splitfor argument parsing rather thanshell=True, it remains a high-privilege capability that executes local binaries. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
publishfunction inlib/backend_selector.pydynamically assembles and runs a command-line string based on environment configuration to delegate post publishing to external scripts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skills
x-audience-insights,x-hook-extractor, andx-reply-drafteringest untrusted data from X (tweets and replies) either through direct user paste or the Apify API (lib/apify_client.py). - Ingestion points: Tweet and reply text enters the agent context through
ApifyClientmethods or manual user input. - Boundary markers: Explicit boundary markers for external data are absent in the script logic, though the system relies on markdown instruction constraints.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities for network access, file writing (to
references/voice-profile.md), and arbitrary command execution (via the DIY poster). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of ingested tweet content is implemented before processing by the model.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill bundle makes network requests to several external service providers:
api.publora.comfor content distribution.api.apify.comfor data extraction.api.pixfaro.comfor image generation. These are documented as primary integrations for the skill's marketing functionality.
Audit Metadata