x-thread-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, user-provided content such as raw notes, transcripts, and results to generate threads. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if the source material contains malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the drafting process.
- Ingestion points: Topic and raw material (notes, transcript, result) gathered in Step 1 of
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters for user input, though it enforces strict formatting and human review steps.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to publish content via
lib.publishinSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is mentioned before the thread generation phase, however, a mandatory human-in-the-loop approval step (Step 9) is required before any publishing occurs.
- [SAFE]: The skill uses an internal library tool (
lib.publish) to interact with a well-known service (https://x.com/compose/tweet) for its primary intended purpose. This interaction is transparently documented in the skill instructions. - [SAFE]: The skill references local configuration files (e.g.,
voice-profile.md,story-bank.md) to maintain consistency. These references are static and do not involve user-controlled paths or external network requests.
Audit Metadata