youtube-marketing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
lib/backend_selector.pyscript contains functionality for a 'Tier 2 - DIY' publishing mode. When enabled, it retrieves a command string from the
YOUTUBE_SKILLS_CUSTOM_POSTERenvironment variable and executes it usingsubprocess.run. Although the script usesshlex.splitto parse the command and passes data viastdinrather than through shell expansion, it enables the execution of arbitrary local binaries if the environment variable is configured. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Several skills in the bundle are designed to ingest and process untrusted data from external sources, which could be leveraged for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The
yt-audience-insightsskill fetches user comments vialib/youtube_client.py, and theyt-repurposerskill reads content from external blogs, X (Twitter) threads, and LinkedIn posts. - Capability inventory: The bundle has the ability to perform network operations and execute shell commands (via the DIY backend).
- Boundary markers: The instructions direct the agent to show drafts to the user within markdown blockquotes, which provides a visual boundary but does not programmatically isolate the content.
- Sanitization: The skills include logic to strip 'AI vocabulary' and specific punctuation, but they lack rigorous sanitization or escaping of the external data before it is re-processed or passed to publishing backends.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill bundle communicates with several external APIs to perform its intended functions:
- It sends video metadata and media to
api.publora.comfor scheduling and publishing. - It sends image generation prompts and receives hosted URLs from
api.pixfaro.com. - It retrieves channel and comment data from Google's official
www.googleapis.com(YouTube Data API v3).
Audit Metadata