yt-hook-scripter

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts and parses external URLs to gather video context, which creates a surface for potential indirect prompt injection if the source content contains malicious instructions.\n
  • Ingestion points: External URLs are parsed using lib/url_parser.py in Step 1.\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to treat parsed data as untrusted or to use delimiters to separate it from instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to lib.publish for external data transmission and yt-community-post-writer for profile analysis.\n
  • Sanitization: A 'Humanizer pass' (Step 6) filters specific stylistic markers but does not provide security-focused sanitization of the ingested data.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes a local script, lib/url_parser.py, to process and parse metadata from provided URLs.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions involve running an external command-line tool, yt-community-post-writer --mode profile, to analyze a user's previous community posts and establish a voice profile.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill utilizes the lib.publish function to send metadata (titles, descriptions, and hooks) to external services. This is a core feature but constitutes a data transmission capability, though it is protected by a mandatory user approval step (Step 7 and 8).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 02:28 AM