secondbrain-transcribe
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted meeting transcript data from external providers (Fireflies.ai) that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Meeting transcripts are fetched via the
FirefliesClient.get_transcript()method as described inSKILL.md(Step 3). - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings when processing the transcript text into structured fields.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write files to
docs/discussions/and.claude/data/discussions/, and it can trigger the/secondbrain-adrskill workflow. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external transcript content before it is processed or written to disk.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic module loading from local paths based on the
providerconfiguration. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to modifysys.pathand import a library whose name is determined by theintegrations.transcription.providersetting (e.g.,from fireflies import FirefliesClient). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from Fireflies.ai, a well-known meeting transcription service.
- Details: Accesses meeting data and summaries from
https://api.fireflies.ai/graphqlusing a Bearer token. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill can trigger other agent capabilities based on the data it processes from the transcripts.
- Evidence: In Step 7, the skill scans decisions for potential ADR candidates and triggers the
/secondbrain-adrskill workflow if the user confirms the action.
Audit Metadata