secondbrain-transcribe

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted meeting transcript data from external providers (Fireflies.ai) that could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Meeting transcripts are fetched via the FirefliesClient.get_transcript() method as described in SKILL.md (Step 3).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not employ specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings when processing the transcript text into structured fields.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write files to docs/discussions/ and .claude/data/discussions/, and it can trigger the /secondbrain-adr skill workflow.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, escaping, or validation of the external transcript content before it is processed or written to disk.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic module loading from local paths based on the provider configuration.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to modify sys.path and import a library whose name is determined by the integrations.transcription.provider setting (e.g., from fireflies import FirefliesClient).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches data from Fireflies.ai, a well-known meeting transcription service.
  • Details: Accesses meeting data and summaries from https://api.fireflies.ai/graphql using a Bearer token.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill can trigger other agent capabilities based on the data it processes from the transcripts.
  • Evidence: In Step 7, the skill scans decisions for potential ADR candidates and triggers the /secondbrain-adr skill workflow if the user confirms the action.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 06:26 PM