lark-shared
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates processing output from
lark-cli, which can contain content from external Lark/Feishu documents, wiki nodes, and API responses, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Structured JSON output from
lark-cli(stdout/stderr) containing remote data (e.g.,lark-cli wiki +node-get). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary delimiters for the agent when interpreting untrusted data fields within the JSON output envelopes.
- Capability inventory: The agent can perform authentication tasks, manage cloud storage resources (
drive), and read/write workspace content. - Sanitization: The skill provides excellent sanitization guidance, including enforcing relative path validation and advising the use of argument arrays (argv) instead of shell concatenation to prevent command injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines clear patterns for executing the
lark-clibinary to manage Lark resources. - Evidence: Explicit instructions for
lark-cli auth,lark-cli config,lark-cli drive, andlark-cli wikicommands. - Security Protocols: Implements a structured 'high-risk-write' confirmation protocol (exit code 10) requiring explicit user consent before proceeding with dangerous operations.
Audit Metadata