marketing-video
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The setup documentation in
references/setup.mdexplicitly suggests that the user "Request an unsandboxed run" if platform security restrictions (sandboxing) prevent the browser from launching or accessing GPU resources. Encouraging the removal of security boundaries is a significant risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies heavily on executing external binaries for media processing. The scripts
media.mjs,render.mjs,mix.mjs,takes.mjs, andpick.mjsuseexecFileSync,spawn, andspawnSyncto runffmpeg,ffprobe,python, andwhisper. The arguments for these commands are derived fromstoryboard.jsonandlines.json, which could be manipulated if sourced from untrusted inputs. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/takes.mjs, a multi-line Python script is dynamically constructed as a string and executed usingspawnSyncwith the-cflag. This pattern of runtime code generation and execution is a common vector for injecting arbitrary logic. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires downloading and installing multiple external packages and binaries during the setup phase, including Playwright, FFmpeg, and Python libraries for speech and transcription. Additionally, the
chatterbox-ttslibrary is documented to download model weights from Hugging Face on its first run. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-controlled text from
lines.jsonandstoryboard.json, which is then rendered usinginnerHTMLwithin a Playwright-controlled browser instance inassets/template/engine.js. This creates a vulnerability where malicious content in the input files could lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) or other execution within the rendering browser environment.
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