cookbook-add-model
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches content from external HuggingFace model cards to automatically populate documentation fields and prose. This represents a potential attack surface where a malicious model card could attempt to influence the agent's output.
- Ingestion points: HuggingFace model card pages (SKILL.md Phase 1).
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat the fetched content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files (MDX, JSX), execute shell commands (git, gh, mint, python), and create Pull Requests (SKILL.md Phase 6).
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or validating the text extracted from the external source before it is used to generate documentation.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's instructions involve downloading software and libraries from well-known repositories and registries.
- Evidence: Installs the
Pillowimage processing library from PyPI (references/vendor-logo.md). - Evidence: Installs the
uvandsglangpackages via pip/uv (templates/page.mdx.tmpl). - Evidence: Downloads and installs the
sgl-evaltool from the vendor's GitHub repository (templates/config.jsx.tmpl). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several standard command-line tools for development and documentation workflows.
- Evidence: Uses
gitfor branching and committing changes, andghfor managing Pull Requests and performing duplicate checks (SKILL.md). - Evidence: Uses
mint(Mintlify CLI) for documentation validation and local development (SKILL.md Phase 3). - Evidence: Uses
python3for creating virtual environments, installing packages, and running image processing tasks (references/vendor-logo.md).
Audit Metadata