sglang-prod-incident-triage
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/incident_artifact_tool.pyandscripts/replay_trusted_request_dump.pyuse thepickle.load()function to process diagnostic files. This is a well-known unsafe deserialization pattern that allows for arbitrary code execution if the input file is malicious. - Evidence:
scripts/replay_trusted_request_dump.pyexplicitly states in its docstring that it uses 'plain pickle loading to bypass SafeUnpickler restrictions' which were implemented to prevent these exact security risks. - Evidence: The functions
load_dump_payloadandload_recordsboth open and load binary data usingpickle.load()without any integrity verification or sandboxing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to run these Python scripts against local files (e.g.,
python3 scripts/incident_artifact_tool.py summarize-dump --input-file /path/to/crash_dump.pkl). If a user or an agent is tricked into analyzing a malicious pickle file provided by an external source, it will lead to immediate code execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize data from SGLang servers and diagnostic dumps.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/incident_artifact_tool.pyperforms network requests to various SGLang endpoints (/metrics,/server_info,/v1/loads) and processes the responses. Both scripts also read binary.pklfiles. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or warnings for the agent to ignore instructions that might be embedded in the diagnostic data.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to execute shell commands, perform network operations, and read/write files in
/tmp. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform validation on the contents of the diagnostic data before processing it or displaying summaries to the user.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata