collavre
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill stores a sensitive OAuth authentication token in plain text within the configuration file located at
~/.config/collavre/config.jsonvia theauthcommand.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: In theMcpClientclass inscripts/collavre, the authentication token is attached to requests sent to asessionUrlwhich is retrieved dynamically from the server's response during the connection handshake. A malicious server could provide an attacker-controlled URL to intercept and steal the token.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Theimportcommand inscripts/collavreusesfs.readFileSyncto read local file contents and transmits them to a remote service. This behavior can be exploited to exfiltrate sensitive local data if an agent is manipulated into importing unintended files.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through theimportcommand, which processes markdown data from external sources and passes it to thecreative_import_servicetool without sanitization or boundary markers.\n - Ingestion points: Local files or stdin read via
fs.readFileSyncinscripts/collavre.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. Raw content is passed directly to the remote tool.\n
- Capability inventory: Subprocess-equivalent tool calls via network POST and local file read access.\n
- Sanitization: None performed on the imported markdown content.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script initiates network connections to user-provided URLs and dynamically received session endpoints using the Node.js
httpsandhttpmodules.
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