tailwind-to-stylex
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted source code files (e.g., .tsx files) to identify and migrate Tailwind utility classes. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in code comments or strings within the processed files could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the migration process.\n
- Ingestion points: User-provided source files (src/*.tsx), configuration files (package.json, tailwind.config.ts), and build configurations (vite.config.ts).\n
- Boundary markers: Not present. The instructions do not specify using delimiters or safety warnings when reading file content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes file system read/write operations and encourages the execution of project tools like typecheckers and linters.\n
- Sanitization: Not present. External code content is interpolated into the conversion logic without explicit sanitization or filtering.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow instructs the agent to verify the migration by running project-specific tools, such as a typechecker or linter (Step 7). Additionally, the instructions involve checking and potentially configuring the project environment by installing dependencies (Step 1). While these are standard development practices, they involve the execution of shell commands in the user's environment based on the project's configuration files.
Audit Metadata