skills/shahid0/skills/agy-ui-director/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agy-ui-director

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a 'Designer-Mindset Override' in SKILL.md and references/prompt-contract.md. These instructions explicitly tell the agent to 'Do not follow the prompt literally' and to 'infer the user's real intent,' which is a directive to bypass user-provided constraints and safety guidelines in favor of the skill's internal design philosophy.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow involves executing local CLI commands using the agy tool and rg (ripgrep) to perform project-wide searches and UI generation. Examples in references/agy-cli.md demonstrate passing file contents directly into shell command arguments using $(cat "$PROMPT_FILE").
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: references/agy-cli.md documents the availability and use of the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag for the agy CLI. This flag is designed to suppress security prompts and bypass environment restrictions during automated UI implementation runs.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'Project Inspection' phase in references/project-inspection.md involves scanning the entire file tree (rg --files) and reading manifest files, design system tokens, and source code. This data is then formatted into a 'Visual Outcome Brief' and transmitted to remote LLM models (including Gemini, Claude, and GPT-OSS variants) via the agy CLI.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill consumes untrusted data from the local project workspace to construct prompts for the implementation engine.
  • Ingestion points: Project inspection scans (references/project-inspection.md) target the file tree, package manifests, and existing source code files.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore malicious content embedded within the ingested project files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution via the agy CLI and filesystem reading through ripgrep.
  • Sanitization: While references/agy-cli.md warns the agent to keep secrets and API keys out of prompts, it lacks programmatic sanitization or filtering of the ingested data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 15, 2026, 09:24 AM