workflow-from-chats
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted chat transcripts to generate persistent artifacts like rules and skills.\n
- Ingestion points: Reads Cursor chat transcripts and subagent logs (SKILL.md).\n
- Boundary markers: Absent; the workflow does not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying commands embedded within the transcripts being analyzed.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill identifies the ability to write and edit files (new skills, rules, workflow docs) based on extracted content.\n
- Sanitization: Absent; while it filters for 'reusable guidance,' it does not perform security validation or sanitization of the extracted content before writing it to the filesystem.
Audit Metadata