agency-agents-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from project specification files which may contain instructions targeting the orchestrator or its sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from files located at
project-specs/[project]-setup.mdandproject-tasks/[project]-tasklist.mdthroughout the workflow phases. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions for the agents to ignore potential prompt injections embedded within the project files.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator has the capability to spawn numerous specialized agents (e.g., Frontend Developer, Backend Architect, EvidenceQA) and execute shell commands (
ls,cat,grep). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the input data before it is passed to agents or used in shell commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands to manage file state and track progress during the autonomous workflow.
- Evidence: The workflow includes commands such as
ls -la,cat, andgrepto verify file existence and count tasks (e.g.,TASK_COUNT=$(grep -c "^### \[ \]" ...)). These are used for project management within the local environment.
Audit Metadata