meta-optimize
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and applies diff-based patches to SKILL.md files. Since these files define the agent's operational logic and constraints, this constitutes a dynamic self-modification of the agent's instruction set based on runtime analysis.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads
.aris/meta/events.jsonl, which contains sensitive interaction metadata including previews of user prompts and tool usage summaries. This data is transmitted to an external model (gpt-5.4) via themcp__codex__codextool for automated review of proposed optimizations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and analyzes untrusted data from user interaction logs without sanitization or strict boundary enforcement. \n
- Ingestion points: Raw user prompts and arguments are read from the
.aris/meta/events.jsonlfile. \n - Boundary markers: None are employed when interpolating log entries into the analysis and review prompts. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to file system modification tools (
Edit,Write,Bash) and external model invocation tools. \n - Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on log content before it is processed by the logic engine.
Audit Metadata