meta-optimize

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and applies diff-based patches to SKILL.md files. Since these files define the agent's operational logic and constraints, this constitutes a dynamic self-modification of the agent's instruction set based on runtime analysis.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads .aris/meta/events.jsonl, which contains sensitive interaction metadata including previews of user prompts and tool usage summaries. This data is transmitted to an external model (gpt-5.4) via the mcp__codex__codex tool for automated review of proposed optimizations.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and analyzes untrusted data from user interaction logs without sanitization or strict boundary enforcement. \n
  • Ingestion points: Raw user prompts and arguments are read from the .aris/meta/events.jsonl file. \n
  • Boundary markers: None are employed when interpolating log entries into the analysis and review prompts. \n
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to file system modification tools (Edit, Write, Bash) and external model invocation tools. \n
  • Sanitization: No validation or filtering is performed on log content before it is processed by the logic engine.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 19, 2026, 03:14 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — meta-optimize