auto-polish

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes Node.js scripts (scan-arsenal.mjs, picker.mjs) to discover installed tools and serve a local interface.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata from other local skills.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/scan-arsenal.mjs reads SKILL.md frontmatter from all directories in ~/.claude/skills/ and server configurations from ~/.claude/settings.json.
  • Boundary markers: Lacks explicit boundary markers or warnings when subagents process the extracted metadata.
  • Capability inventory: The skill orchestrates multi-agent workflows and executes shell commands for building variants and running tools.
  • Sanitization: Ingested skill descriptions and titles are used directly in prompts and UI without validation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The local server in scripts/picker.mjs enables Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. A malicious website could potentially trigger the /save endpoint to overwrite the selection.json configuration file, influencing the agent's subsequent tool selection.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill scans sensitive local files like ~/.claude/settings.json and the environment PATH to locate and inventory installed design tools.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 07:46 PM