pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule to execute system utilities for file conversion and comparison. \n scripts/thumbnail.pyinvokessofficeandpdftoppmfor rendering slide images. \nscripts/office/validators/redlining.pycallsgit diffto compare text content between document versions. \nscripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesgccto compile a library shim. \n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic code generation and library injection to modify the behavior of external tools. \nscripts/office/soffice.pycompiles hardcoded C source code into a shared object file at runtime usinggcc. \n- The library is then injected into the
sofficeprocess memory using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to shim socket-related system calls. \n - While documented for environment compatibility, the ability to compile and inject code represents a high-privilege pattern. \n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection when processing document content. \n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through text and XML parsed from user-provided documents by
scripts/office/unpack.pyand themarkitdownmodule. \n - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not employ delimiters or explicit instructions to delineate document content from agent instructions. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill environment has access to shell command execution through the
subprocesscalls listed in the command execution finding. \n - Sanitization: While XML parsing is hardened using
defusedxml, the extracted content itself is not sanitized for potential instruction-based payloads before being processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata