webapp-testing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/with_server.pyusessubprocess.Popenwithshell=Trueto execute commands provided via the--serverflag. While this supports complex startup commands (e.g., usingcdand&&), it creates a vector for command injection if the agent incorporates untrusted input into these arguments.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scriptscripts/with_server.pyexecutes arbitrary trailing commands usingsubprocess.run(), which is its primary intended function for running automation tests.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads and processes arbitrary content from web applications (viapage.content()and DOM inspection). Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through Playwright's page inspection functions inexamples/element_discovery.pyand instructions inSKILL.md. Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is encouraged to read the DOM directly without specific instructions to ignore embedded commands. Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (viascripts/with_server.py) and write/run arbitrary Python code. Sanitization: None present in the provided examples or helper scripts.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: TheSKILL.mdfile contains instructions explicitly telling the agent not to read the source code of the helper scripts unless absolutely necessary. While framed as a context-window optimization, this functions as a concealment pattern that discourages the agent from inspecting the underlying command execution logic.
Audit Metadata