officecli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's installation instructions include downloading scripts from a remote domain and piping them directly to shell interpreters (e.g.,
curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bashandirm https://d.officecli.ai/install.ps1 | iex). This practice bypasses inspection of the code before execution and is a high-risk method for distributing software. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing a local binary (
officecli) to perform complex operations on the file system and Office documents. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables the agent to parse external document content, making it vulnerable to malicious instructions embedded in those files. 1. Ingestion points: Document content is read into the agent's context through commands like
officecli get,officecli view text, andofficecli query(SKILL.md). 2. Boundary markers: The skill does not provide any delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore or isolate instructions found within the document data. 3. Capability inventory: The agent has the power to create, modify, and delete elements in files usingset,add,remove,batch, andraw-set(SKILL.md). 4. Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from documents before the agent processes it.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata