codex-dev-native
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted project data to guide an external implementation agent.
- Ingestion points: In Step 2, the skill reads project-specific configuration files (
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md) and user-provided task descriptions to synthesize a 'brief' for the Codex CLI. - Boundary markers: The generated brief utilizes XML tags based on
codex:gpt-5-4-promptingguidelines and includes a dedicated 'Hard constraints' section to restrict the external agent's operations. - Capability inventory: The skill executes the Codex engine via
node, performsgitoperations for branch management, and runs project-defined commands such asnpm install,pip install, and various test suites in Steps 0, 3, and 5. - Sanitization: The skill's workflow includes a mandatory manual review step (Step 6) where the orchestrating agent is instructed to personally verify all code changes and avoid delegating the review back to the Codex engine.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs multiple command-line operations to setup the environment and execute the Codex implementation logic.
- Evidence: Step 0 involves locating and executing a script (
codex-companion.mjs) from the user's plugin cache ($HOME/.claude/plugins/cache/openai-codex/) usingnode. - Evidence: The skill modifies the global configuration file
~/.codex/config.tomlto enablenetwork_accessfor theworkspace-writesandbox environment. - Evidence: The skill executes arbitrary project setup, linting, and testing commands within dynamically created git worktrees in Steps 3 and 5.
Audit Metadata