codex-dev
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes extensive bash commands to manage the development environment, including git operations like
git rev-parse,git checkout,git worktree, andgit merge, as well as directory creation and command availability checks. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates JavaScript workflow files (
.workflow.js) at runtime and executes them using theomega runcommand. It also executes dynamically constructed Python code viapython3 -to process JSON data and persist run states. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill prompts the user to perform global installations of external Node.js packages (
@openai/codexandomegacode). It also suggests usingsudofor these installations if necessary, which is a privilege escalation concern. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill performs checks for sensitive authentication files and environment variables, specifically verifying the existence of
~/.codex/auth.json,CODEX_API_KEY, andOPENAI_API_KEYduring its preflight phase. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by reading project-level documentation (such as
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md, and spec docs) and interpolating their contents into a "task brief" that is subsequently executed by an external AI agent. - Ingestion points: Reads files like
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md, and project-specific documentation in Step 2. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when including external file content in the brief.
- Capability inventory: The system has capabilities to write to the workspace (
workspace-writesandbox) and execute project-defined test and lint commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content read from external documentation files before interpolation.
Audit Metadata