calling-rust-from-tauri-frontend
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a surface for indirect prompt injection by demonstrating how to process untrusted data from the frontend in backend Rust commands.
- Ingestion points: Multiple functions in
SKILL.md, such asread_file(path: String),open_file(path: String), andfetch_data(url: String), ingest string parameters directly from the JavaScriptinvokecaller. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions advising the agent or developer to treat the frontend input as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within the input.
- Capability inventory: The code snippets include file system access via
std::fs::read,std::fs::read_to_string, andtokio::fs::File::open, as well as network access viareqwest::get. - Sanitization: The provided code lacks any input validation, path normalization, or URL allow-listing to prevent exploitation of the provided capabilities.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides code templates that facilitate data exposure. The
read_fileandopen_filefunctions inSKILL.mdallow the backend to read and return the contents of any file path provided by the frontend. Without path validation or restriction to a specific sandbox directory, these patterns could be used to expose sensitive system files if the frontend becomes compromised or is manipulated via indirect injection.
Audit Metadata