calling-rust-from-tauri-frontend

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a surface for indirect prompt injection by demonstrating how to process untrusted data from the frontend in backend Rust commands.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple functions in SKILL.md, such as read_file(path: String), open_file(path: String), and fetch_data(url: String), ingest string parameters directly from the JavaScript invoke caller.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions advising the agent or developer to treat the frontend input as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within the input.
  • Capability inventory: The code snippets include file system access via std::fs::read, std::fs::read_to_string, and tokio::fs::File::open, as well as network access via reqwest::get.
  • Sanitization: The provided code lacks any input validation, path normalization, or URL allow-listing to prevent exploitation of the provided capabilities.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides code templates that facilitate data exposure. The read_file and open_file functions in SKILL.md allow the backend to read and return the contents of any file path provided by the frontend. Without path validation or restriction to a specific sandbox directory, these patterns could be used to expose sensitive system files if the frontend becomes compromised or is manipulated via indirect injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 26, 2026, 10:23 PM