agent-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub Pull Requests, including code changes and PR descriptions, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the review agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Pull Request metadata and file contents are fetched from GitHub repositories using the
ghCLI and theagent-code-reviewtool as documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The provided instructions do not specify explicit delimiters or warnings to separate untrusted PR content from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: According to
SKILL.md, the agent can execute shell commands via theagent-code-reviewbinary and has access to file system tools likeRead,Grep, andGlob. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation logic for the ingested PR content is described in the skill metadata.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
agent-code-reviewCLI tool to manage the review queue, author roster, and server configuration. It also relies on the availability ofgh,duckdb, and AI inference engines (codexorclaude) on the system PATH.
Audit Metadata