agent-slack
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates the extraction of sensitive authentication material from the local host environment.
- Evidence: The
auth import-desktopandauth import-browsercommands (documented inreferences/commands/auth.md) access local application data directories and browser profiles for Chrome, Brave, Firefox, Safari, and Opera to extract Slack session tokens (xoxc, xoxd). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a raw escape hatch for executing arbitrary Slack API methods.
- Evidence: The
api call <method>command (documented inreferences/commands/other.md) allows the agent to POST any Slack Web API method directly, which can bypass the constraints and logic implemented in the standard command set. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Certain authentication features require elevated system-level permissions.
- Evidence: The
auth import-browser safaricommand (referenced inreferences/commands/auth.md) explicitly notes that it requires "Full Disk Access" permissions on macOS to access the Safari cookie store. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from an external source (Slack) which may contain malicious instructions targeting the agent.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads external content via
message get,message list,search messages, andunreads(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit boundary markers or instruction-ignoring delimiters for the retrieved content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to send messages, delete content, invite users, run workflows, and write/read files within the local cache directory.
- Sanitization: Content is rendered as a Markdown string by merging raw Slack text and blocks (references/formatting.md).
Audit Metadata