agent-vercel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external sources and possesses state-changing capabilities.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads deployment logs (
deployment logs), runtime logs (deployment runtime-logs), commit messages (deployment get), and environment variables (env get) which are sourced from external developers or codebases (SKILL.md, references/commands.md). - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the logs or commit messages.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to perform high-impact actions including
deployment promote,deployment rollback,env set,alias set, and rawapi calloperations (references/commands.md). - Sanitization: The underlying tool uses NDJSON for structured output and implements a
--max-body-charsflag to truncate long log outputs, which provides some mitigation against very large injection payloads (references/output.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides the agent with the ability to execute a wide range of shell commands via the
agent-vercelCLI tool. This includes sensitive operations likeenv pull, which writes decrypted environment variables to a local.envfile, andauth add, which modifies the system Keychain (SKILL.md, references/commands.md).
Audit Metadata