lin
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through data ingested from the Linear platform.\n
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
lin issue get,lin project get, andlin document get(described inSKILL.md) retrieve external markdown content and comments into the agent's context.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to distinguish between its primary instructions and potential commands embedded in the fetched Linear content.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent can use the
lintool to perform actions in the workspace and has access to local files through theRead,Grep, andGlobtools.\n - Sanitization: The skill does not implement sanitization or filtering for the markdown content retrieved from Linear.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates interaction with the Linear platform through a dedicated CLI binary.\n
- Evidence: The
allowed-toolssection inSKILL.mdpermitsBash(lin *)commands, enabling the agent to manage issues and projects.\n - Note: A raw GraphQL escape hatch is provided via
lin api queryfor authenticated API access.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill allows the agent to upload local files to Linear's CDN.\n - Evidence: The
lin file uploadcommand and the--fileflag inlin issue comment newfacilitate the transmission of local data to a remote service.\n - Context: Linear is recognized as a well-known service, and this functionality is a core component of the intended issue-tracking workflow.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides capabilities to download assets from Linear's infrastructure.\n
- Evidence: The
lin file downloadcommand fetches content from theuploads.linear.appdomain.\n - Context: This interaction targets a well-known service and is a legitimate part of the skill's functionality.
Audit Metadata