lin
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources such as Linear issues, projects, documents, and comments, which are then interpolated into the agent's context. This data could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's subsequent actions. 1. Ingestion points:
lin issue get,lin project get,lin initiative get,lin document get, andlin issue comment list(SKILL.md). 2. Boundary markers: The skill documentation notes that long text fields are truncated to 200 characters by default (references/output.md), but this can be bypassed using the--fullor--expandflags. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has broad execution capabilities viaBash(lin *), including the ability to modify or delete resources and execute raw GraphQL queries. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization of the ingested content is mentioned. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill allows downloading files from Linear's official CDN. Evidence: The
lin file downloadcommand (SKILL.md) targetshttps://uploads.linear.app/. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides an interface for executing Linear operations. Evidence: The
lintool is invoked through theBashtool with broad arguments (lin *), as seen in theallowed-toolssection of SKILL.md. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes an 'escape hatch' for executing raw GraphQL queries. Evidence: The
lin api querycommand (SKILL.md) allows the execution of arbitrary GraphQL strings against the Linear API.
Audit Metadata