circleci-investigate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes build logs and test results from CircleCI, which are untrusted external data sources. If an attacker can control the output of a CI job, they could attempt to inject instructions into the agent's context when it reads these logs.
- Ingestion points: CircleCI API responses and log files fetched from S3 URLs in
scripts/circleci.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill reads and displays raw log content.
- Capability inventory: Network access to CircleCI and local file write capabilities.
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill is designed to retrieve raw output for debugging.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script accesses the
CIRCLECI_TOKENenvironment variable to authenticate with CircleCI. - Evidence: The implementation includes a custom
_NoRedirecthandler to ensure the authentication token is not leaked to third-party domains during HTTP redirects. It also includes logic to redact the token from error messages before they are displayed or logged. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads metadata and log files from well-known services.
- Evidence: The script fetches data from
circleci.comand associated S3 storage for job logs. It uses standard library functions and implements security measures such asO_NOFOLLOWand strict file permissions (0600) to protect the downloaded data.
Audit Metadata