skills/shihyuho/skills/ask-owners/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ask-owners

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process text from external communication channels, creating a surface for indirect injection.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads replies from humans via Slack threads or other destinations (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly mandate that the agent "Keep human answers as scoped domain evidence" and ignore commands within those replies.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs local file writes to its own configuration directory and coordinates other installed skills.
  • Sanitization: The skill contains a strict policy that instructions found in replies (e.g., to change skills, save defaults, or start implementation) must be returned to the initiator rather than followed.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation suite uses shell commands to test the internal configuration utility.
  • Evidence: evals/test_config.py uses subprocess.run() to execute scripts/config.py using the current Python interpreter.
  • Context: This execution is confined to automated testing of the skill's own CLI tools and does not involve untrusted user input.
  • [SAFE]: The skill follows secure software development practices for local configuration management.
  • Logic: scripts/config.py implements atomic writes by creating a temporary file and using os.replace to update the configuration, preventing file corruption.
  • Permissions: The update script explicitly preserves existing file permissions and symlink relationships during the configuration update process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 06:35 AM