ask-owners
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process text from external communication channels, creating a surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads replies from humans via Slack threads or other destinations (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly mandate that the agent "Keep human answers as scoped domain evidence" and ignore commands within those replies.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs local file writes to its own configuration directory and coordinates other installed skills.
- Sanitization: The skill contains a strict policy that instructions found in replies (e.g., to change skills, save defaults, or start implementation) must be returned to the initiator rather than followed.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The evaluation suite uses shell commands to test the internal configuration utility.
- Evidence:
evals/test_config.pyusessubprocess.run()to executescripts/config.pyusing the current Python interpreter. - Context: This execution is confined to automated testing of the skill's own CLI tools and does not involve untrusted user input.
- [SAFE]: The skill follows secure software development practices for local configuration management.
- Logic:
scripts/config.pyimplements atomic writes by creating a temporary file and usingos.replaceto update the configuration, preventing file corruption. - Permissions: The update script explicitly preserves existing file permissions and symlink relationships during the configuration update process.
Audit Metadata