recipe-diagnose
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable and passes it directly to specialized sub-agents. - Ingestion points: The
$ARGUMENTSvalue is passed verbatim into theinvestigatorsub-agent prompt under thePhenomenonfield inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a simple label (
Phenomenon:) but lacks explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings to prevent the sub-agent from executing commands contained within the user input. - Capability inventory: The sub-agents (investigator, verifier, solver) are instructed to perform broad investigations across code, history, and configuration, and to derive solutions, which could be subverted by a successful injection.
- Sanitization: No input validation, escaping, or filtering is performed on the user-supplied problem description before it is used to build prompts.
Audit Metadata