recipe-front-build
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from markdown task files located on the filesystem, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill computes a "Consumed Task Set" by reading files matching the
{plan-name}-task-*.mdpattern from thedocs/plans/tasks/directory. - Boundary markers: While the skill references an "Orchestrator Execution Boundary" and a separate orchestration guide, it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded prompts within the task files themselves.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including the ability to invoke subagents for code execution, perform integration tests, and execute
git commitoperations. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for the task files before their contents are passed to the
task-executor-frontendsubagent.
Audit Metadata