recipe-front-design
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an orchestration flow that ingests external data (user requirements via $ARGUMENTS) and passes it to multiple subagents without sufficient isolation or boundary markers.\n
- Ingestion points: User requirements are processed in Step 1 and passed verbatim to codebase-analyzer (Step 2) and ui-analyzer (Step 3) as the governing source.\n
- Boundary markers: The skill uses simple square-bracket placeholders (e.g., [confirmed requirements verbatim]) but does not instruct the agent to use distinct delimiters or tell subagents to ignore any instructions embedded within the requirements text.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill invokes a suite of tools (dev-workflows-frontend namespace) capable of codebase analysis, UI spec generation, and technical design document creation, involving filesystem operations.\n
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation steps are defined to ensure the requirements do not contain malicious prompts intended to steer the behavior of the specialist agents.
Audit Metadata